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Hallee C. Kansman 
 
The protection status of the Greater Yellowstone grizzly bear 
continues to elicit debate and find its way into the courtroom. In Crow 
Indian Tribe v. United States, for the second time in the last decade, a court 
held the Service’s attempt to delist the Yellowstone Grizzly arbitrary and 
capricious. Specifically, the court found the Service’s evaluation of 
remnant populations, recalibration, and genetic health deficient. This case 
demonstrates the importance in and the resilient motivation behind 
preserving grizzly bear populations and genetics. As the practice of 
delisting a species under the Endangered Species Act continues, this case 
will provide important persuasive precedent in those inevitable future 
cases.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2007, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) published 
a final rule (“2007 Rule”) distinguishing the Greater Yellowstone grizzly 
bear (“Yellowstone Grizzly” or “Grizzly”) as a distinct population 
segment and delisting it.1 As a result of a challenge to the 2007 Rule, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed a United States District Court for the District of 
Montana’s (“District Court” or “court”) holding and vacated and 
remanded the 2007 Rule to the Service with instructions to properly 
determine the listing status of the Grizzly under the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”).2 After ten years the Service issued its new final rule (“2017 
Rule”), delisting the Grizzly.3 The promulgation of the 2017 Rule was then 
challenged, resulting in the D.C. Circuit decision in Humane Society v. 
Zinke.4 In response to the D.C. Circuit’s holding, the Service reopened 
public comment for the 2017 Rule and conducted a regulatory review, but 
ultimately chose to stick with its earlier determinations regarding delisting 
the Yellowstone Grizzly.5 The Crow Tribe, along with other interested 
parties (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit following the delisting, and 
the District Court issued two 14-day temporary restraining orders before 
vacating the 2017 Rule and remanding back to the Service.6 
 
                                                     
1.  Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 163319, 2018 WL 4568418, *3 (D. Mont. Sept. 24, 2018). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  865 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding the Service acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously when it failed to address the effect of delisting a distinct population 
segment of wolves on the remnant population). 
5.  Crow Indian Tribe, 2018 WL at *3.  
6.  Id.  
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
During pre-colonial settlement, an estimated 50,000 grizzly bears 
roamed the continental states, occupying terrain outside mountain 
ecosystems.7 Roughly a century later, grizzlies were found in only two 
percent of their historical range and by 1975, only six populations were 
identified in the United States.8 That same year, the lower-48 grizzly bear 
was listed as threatened under the ESA.9  
Starting in 1982, the Service concentrated on grizzly recovery in 
six ecosystems, including: “(1) the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 
covering portions of Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho; (2) the Northern 
Continental Divide Ecosystem of north-central Montana; (3) Cabinet-
Yaak area, extending from northwest Montana to northern Idaho; (4) the 
Selkirk Mountains in northern Idaho, northeast Washington, and southeast 
British Columbia; (5) north-central Washington’s North Cascades area; 
and (6) the Bitterroot Mountains of western Montana and central Idaho.”10 
Just two of those ecosystems, the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem 
(“GYE”) and the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem (“NCDE”), 
contain a substantial portion of the overall lower-48 grizzly numbers.11 
The six ecosystems, each geographically isolated from all others, show no 
evidence of interbreeding among their bear populations.12 Additionally, no 
grizzlies originating from the GYE have been suspected or confirmed 
beyond the borders of the distinct population segment.13  
Importantly, when the District Court vacated the 2007 Rule, it 
faulted the Service for: (1) inadequate regulatory mechanisms to ensure a 
healthy grizzly population; and (2) failure to consider the decline of 
whitebark pine seed, a substantial food source.14 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the first finding but affirmed the second, thus vacating the 2007 
Rule.15 
In 2016, as a direct result of the vacating of the 2007 Rule, the 
Service attempted to correct its earlier deficiencies and eventually 
published its 2017 Rule.16 The 2017 Rule included portions of the 
Service’s Conservation Strategy, detailing the procedure for managing and 
monitoring the Grizzly population and assuring sufficient habitat to 
                                                     
7.  Id. at *2. 
8.  Id.  
9.  Id. (“The lower-48 grizzly bear was listed as threatened in 1975, only 
two years after Congress passed the [Endangered Species Act]”). 
10.  Id.  
11.  Id.  
12.  Id. at *3  
13.  Id. (citing Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 
Removing the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Population of Grizzly Bears from the 
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 82 Fed. Reg. 30,502, 30,517-18 
(June 30, 2017)).  
14.  Id.  
15.  Id.  
16.  Id.  
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maintain recovery.17 About one month after issuance of the 2017 Rule, the 
D.C. Circuit decided Humane Society, requiring the Service to conduct 
additional public comment.18 The Service later issued a regulatory review, 
concluding its initial 2017 Rule did not require modification.19 Plaintiffs 
then challenged the 2017 Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) and ESA.20 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The ESA does not hold a judicial review provision for actions 
taken under the Act’s authority. Thus, plaintiffs must use the APA as a 
cause of action to challenge ESA determinations, such as delisting 
decisions.21 The ESA requires the Service to “identify and list species that 
are ‘endangered’ or ‘threatened.’”22 The Service must list and delist a 
species pursuant to a five-factor analysis of potential threats,23 and then 
make decisions “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial 
data available.”24 
Under section 706(2)(A) of the APA, a court must “hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found . . . to be 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”25 Under the APA, a district court may not vacate a rule unless 
the agency acted in one of four specifically prohibited ways.26 Here, the 
                                                     
17.  Id. at *13.  
18.  Id. (citing Humane Society, 865 F.3d 585, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).   
19.  Id.  
20.  Id. at *4 (“The plaintiffs raise two significant challenges to the [2017] 
Rule: (1) the Service violated the APA by failing to consider an important factor in 
delisting the Greater Yellowstone grizzly, which is the impact of delisting on the other 
remaining populations within the continental United States; and (2) the Service 
violated the APA by arbitrarily and capriciously applying the five-factor threats 
analysis demanded by the ESA.”). 
21.  Id. (citing City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, 386 F.3d 1186, 1205-06 (9th 
Cir. 2004)).   
22.  Id. (quoting Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 868 F.3d 1054, 
1057 (9th Cir. 2017)).  
23.  Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (The ESA, under § 4(a), “demands 
that the Secretary consider five potential threats when it reviews a listed entity’s 
classification: (1) ‘the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of [a species’] habitat or range’; (2) ‘overutilization for commercial, recreational, 
scientific, or educational purposes’; (3) ‘disease or predation’; (4) ‘the inadequacy of 
existing regulatory mechanisms’; and (5) ‘other natural or manmade factors affecting 
its continued existence.’”). 
24.  Crow Indian Tribe, 2018 WL at *4 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(b)(1)(A)).  
25.  Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).  
26.  Id. at *10 (“Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the [c]ourt 
may not vacate an agency’s decision unless the agency ‘[1] relied on factors which 
Congress had not intended it to consider, [2] entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem, [3] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or [4] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to 
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” (citation omitted)). 
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District Court reviewed whether the Service acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in: (1) analyzing the threat of delisting on the remnant 
population; (2) requiring recalibration; and (3) providing for translocation 
or natural connectivity. The court focused on whether the Service failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem in determining if the ESA 
allows the Service to delist a distinct population segment without proper 
examination.27 
 
A. Failing to Analyze the Threat of Delisting the Yellowstone Grizzly on 
the Remnant Population was Arbitrary and Capricious 
 
In 1978, Congress amended the ESA by expanding the definition 
of “species” to include distinct populations.28 Plaintiffs argued the ESA 
required the Service to analyze the impact delisting the Yellowstone 
Grizzly could have on other grizzly populations.29 The Service 
unsuccessfully asserted: (1) Plaintiffs’ arguments grounded in Humane 
Society were moot; (2) Humane Society was wrongly decided; and (3) 
Humane Society was distinguishable from the present facts.30 
The court disagreed with the Service’s assertions because the only 
potential difference between the present case and Humane Society was 
“that the Service affirmatively stated the lower-48 grizzly would remain 
listed outside the newly designated population segment.”31 This statement 
contradicted the Service’s position that the management of other grizzlies 
was not within the scope of the Rule.32 The Service stated “it would be 
difficult to justify a distinct population segment in an area where bears 
have not been located for generations.”33 The court held the Service could 
not abuse its power to “delist an already-protected species by 
balkanization,”34 and that “Humane Society [was] only distinguishable on 
a formalistic basis.”35 
 Relying on the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Humane Society, the 
District Court held “[t]he Service’s power [was] to designate genuinely 
discrete population segments,” and not to fractionalize already-protected 
species in order to remove those species’ protections.36 In published policy 
from 1996, the Service acknowledged the importance of distinct 
population segments’ recognition in balance with Congress’ goals  “that 
designation of a distinct population segment should occur sparingly and 
                                                     
27.  Id. (The Service must “insure that any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a 
listed species.”) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
28.  Id. at *5. 
29.  Id.  
30.  Id.  
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. (citing Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 30,502, 30,508 (June 30, 
2017)).  
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. (quoting Humane Society, 865 F.3d at 603). 
35.  Id.  
36.  Id. (quoting Humane Society, 865 F.3d at 603).  
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only when the biological evidence indicates that such action is 
warranted.”37 The ESA does not allow the Service to utilize the distinct 
population segment to forego analysis regarding the overall species’ 
success.38 The Service acknowledged it did not properly analyze the 
impact of delisting the grizzlies outside the Greater Yellowstone area.39 
The District Court held the Service had arbitrarily and capriciously 
determined that analysis of the impact on the grizzlies residing outside the 
Greater Yellowstone area was unnecessary.40  
 
B. Failing to Require Recalibration of Population Estimates in the 
Conservation Strategy was Arbitrary and Capricious. 
 
Plaintiffs next argued the Conservation Strategy was arbitrary and 
capricious because the existing regulatory mechanisms, a factor required 
by the ESA when delisting, were inadequate.41 Specifically, Plaintiffs 
argued reliance on non-binding commitments by the states––Montana, 
Idaho, and Wyoming––was insufficient, and failing to require a 
recalibration of the population was not “reasoned decisionmaking.”42 The 
court first concluded that, because of Ninth Circuit precedent in Greater 
Yellowstone Coalition v. Servheen,43 and the states’ “decades-long 
commitment” to Grizzly management, such specific action was an 
adequate regulatory mechanism.44 However, the District Court held for 
Plaintiffs regarding the recalibration population estimator.45 
The District Court stated, “[T]he Service could not reasonably 
conclude that adequate regulatory mechanisms exist to protect the 
[Grizzly], indicating the states were compelled to participate in the 
Conservation Strategy and neglected best available science.”46 In the 2017 
Rule, the Service indicated the estimation model used may not continue to 
be the best available science; however “it w[ould] continue to be the 
method for estimating the population until a new population estimator 
                                                     
37.  Id. (“[T]he designation of a distinct population segment . . . 
demand[s] an inquiry into three elements: (1) ‘discreteness . . . in relation to the 
remainder of the species to which it belongs’; (2) ‘significance . . . to the species to 
which it belongs’; and (3) ‘conservation status in relation to the [ESA]’s standards for 
listing.’” (citation omitted)). 
38.  Id.  
39.  Id. at *8. (The D.C. Circuit in Humane Society v. Zinke “held that the 
Service has the authority to create and delist a segment in a single action . . .  However, 
. . . the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to consider the effect 
of delisting on other members of the species.” (citation omitted)). 
40.  Id. (By not including “the legal and functional effects of the 
delisting,” the Service ignored the ESA’s policy of “institutionalized caution . . . which 
is necessary to promote the ESA’s purpose of conservation.” (citations omitted)). 
41.  Id. at *12.  
42.  Id.  
43.  672 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Mont. 2009). 
44.  Crow Indian Tribe, 2018 WL at *12 (quoting Final Rule, 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 30,603). 
45.  Id. at *13.  
46.  Id.  
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[wa]s approved.”47 The court cautioned against this determination by 
signaling the danger of establishing a rule based on estimates that the most 
scientifically progressive tools were unresponsive to.48 The court 
acknowledged the actual risk present in the Service’s recalibration, 
characterizing it as “beyond mere speculation.”49 The Service made its 
decision based upon the states’ hardline position on recalibration as a 
negotiating tactic, and not upon the basis of the best available science, as 
required by the ESA.50  
 
C. Failing to Provide for Translocation or Natural Connectivity was 
Arbitrary and Capricious. 
 
Plaintiffs’ final argument asserted the Service’s delisting decision 
was arbitrary and capricious due to a failure to analyze the genetic health 
of the Grizzly.51 The District Court agreed because the Service failed to 
demonstrate “it considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choices made.”52 The court 
held the Service “illogically cobbled together . . . two studies” to reach a 
conclusion of long-term population stability that neither study individually 
supported.53 Thus, the Service failed to show that genetic diversity within 
the Greater Yellowstone area was a “non-issue,” and the court held the 
Service’s determination was arbitrary and capricious.54  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The holding from Crow Indian Tribe v. United States showcases 
the importance of abiding by proper statutory requirements under the ESA 
and APA, and how the application of such standards can influence the 
viability and survival of a threatened or endangered species. In making a 
choice regarding delisting, the Service must rely on best available science 
and impact on other populations.  
The status of the Yellowstone Grizzly is a contentious matter in 
the American west, but the decision by the District Court was clear. 
Procedurally, the GYE Conservation Strategy will remain in place to 
ensure Grizzly population maintenance and the Service’s continuance in 
providing scientific data related to population estimates, habitat, and 
connectivity. Grizzlies are a dominant species in the ecosystem and offer 
both recreational and economic benefits.  
                                                     
47.  Id.  
48.  Id.  
49.  Id. at 14.   
50.  Id.  
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 15.  
53.  Id.  
54.  Id. at 17.  
